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19 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Suggested Changes in the Directive Proposed by the  
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board  
Relating to the National Reconnaissance Organization

1. The original National Reconnaissance Organization agreement - a letter dated 6 September 1961 from Deputy SecDef Gilpatric to CIA Director, Allen Dulles - provided for the establishment of a National Reconnaissance Program covering photographic intelligence, geodasy, mapping and electronic signal collection projects to be managed by the National Reconnaissance Office under joint direction of the Under Secretary of the Air Force and the Deputy Director (Plans) of CIA. This arrangement appears as a partnership to provide for coordination of all phases of the reconnaissance effort within the Air Force (for DoD) and CIA with the intent to utilize appropriately the established skills and capabilities of both organizations.
2. The present agreement, adopted March 13, 1963 and now in force, represents an attempt to improve the management of the NRO. The agreement outlines the authorities of D/NRO and the relationship and understanding which the D/NRO is charged to accomplish

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~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

between the DoD and the CIA. The essence of this arrangement is that in managing the NRP, D/NRO shall utilize talents, resources and special skills of the DoD and the CIA. It is this understanding that Mr. Gilpatric and I attempted to develop in this final NRO agreement. In doing so we hoped to provide managerial authority to the D/NRO under an arrangement which would cause him to utilize the special resources in both CIA and the Air Force in carrying out an agreed NRP and to conduct the operations to be responsive to the requirements and priorities of USIB.

3. The report of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board argues convincingly in support of the basic purposes of the March 13th agreement and the prior ones. However, specific provisions of the directive proposed by the Board would, in my opinion, either serve to perpetuate the managerial difficulties which have developed during the past two and one-half years or establish the Air Force as the "single instrument" in reconnaissance. The reasons for this statement are set forth in my letter of June 11th, 1964 to Mr. Bundy.

4. These difficulties can be avoided if the wording of the Presidential Directive proposed by the PFIAB is modified as indicated below and three of the further recommendations of the President's Board are changed to the extent indicated.

5. If the President elects not to issue such a Directive, then the March 13th agreement should be amended in certain respects in conformity with the suggestions outlined below.

6. The following are specific changes with proposed new matter underscored and proposed deletions in brackets:

1. Definition of the National Reconnaissance Program The Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for the development of a national reconnaissance program as a single program national in character, and responsive to the requirements of the United States Intelligence Board for the development, management, control and operation of all projects, both current and long range, for the collection of intelligence, mapping and geodetic information through overflights (excluding normal peripheral reconnaissance operations). The Secretary of Defense and the Director, Central Intelligence in developing the program shall indicate the departments and agencies responsible for specific activities and shall review the program

from time to time in the interest of insuring its proper execution.

2. Designation of the Secretary of Defense as Executive Agent for the agreed National Reconnaissance Program having primary responsibility and authority for:

a. The management and conduct of the reconnaissance activities involved in the agreed program.

b. The tasking of personnel, facilities, and other resources of the Department of Defense.

7 the Central Intelligence Agency, and other agencies as required to carry out that responsibility.7

c. Levying requirements on the Central Intelligence Agency and other agencies of the government as required to carry out the agreed program.

3. Establishment within the Department of Defense of a National Reconnaissance Office to function as a separate operating agency of the Department of Defense, and to be headed by a Director responsible solely to the Secretary of Defense for discharging the Secretary's responsibility as Executive Agent for the National Reconnaissance Program.

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4. Assignment to the Director of Central Intelligence, as Chairman of the United States Intelligence Board, of the function of sharpening and expediting the efforts of the United States Intelligence Board with respect to: (a) the establishment of realistic intelligence collection requirements to guide the national reconnaissance effort in the scheduling and targeting of satellite and aircraft reconnaissance missions; (b) ensuring prompt processing, analysis and reporting to appropriate users of the photographic and signals intelligence obtained from the national reconnaissance effort; and (c) the fullest utilization of such intelligence in the preparation of national intelligence estimates.

5. Direction that there be a coordinated, comprehensive budget for all elements of the National Reconnaissance Program, reviewed and agreed by the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence and that there be established fiscal control and accounting procedures to assure appropriate utilization of funds by the agencies concerned in support of the Program. (We suggest that the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of the Budget jointly review this matter with a view to achieving the best formula for the accomplishment of these objectives.)

6. Direction to the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, to the heads of the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency and other agencies concerned, that full utilization be made of the resources of each of those agencies as required for the conduct of research and development projects, looking to the development of new and improved aircraft and satellite reconnaissance vehicles, photographic and other sensors, and advanced methods for improved processing and exploitation of the intelligence obtained therefrom, within the general requirements established by the intelligence needs as determined by the United States Intelligence Board.

7. Assignment to the Central Intelligence Agency of the responsibility for providing the Executive Agent with security policy guidance required for the maintenance of a uniform system of security procedures for the National Reconnaissance Program.

8. In lieu of the monitor and review functions provided for in the present National Reconnaissance Program Agreement, periodic reporting by the Executive Agent for the

Program to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, concerning all aspects of the Program, including organization, management, funding, programming, security, advance planning, research and development, production, and operations.<sup>7</sup>

Substitute: The Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence shall in the execution of their respective responsibilities deputize assistants to act for them in matters concerning the management of the National Reconnaissance Program. However, no such action by the Secretary of Defense or the Director of Central Intelligence shall relieve them of their respective responsibility under the arrangement. The Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence, or their representative, deputy or assistant, and the Director/NRO shall from time to time report to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (and the 303 Committee) and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

9. Authorization to the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office to establish a Scientific Advisory Board, to include experts in the fields of science and technology from

**TOP SECRET**

outside the Government, to provide the Director with technical advice and guidance relating to the achievement of national reconnaissance objectives. Nothing contained herein shall prohibit the establishment of advisory panels or boards to provide some guidance relating to the achievement of reconnaissance objectives by any department or agency responsible in this field.

7. With respect to further recommendations of the President's Board, I question Item 2, Page 10, the continued designation of the Under Secretary of the Air Force as Director/NRO. In my judgment the dual role has been a source of many troubles. The D/NRO is obviously torn, wittingly or unwittingly, between known and stated Air Force objectives to become the "single instrument" in the reconnaissance field and his responsibility to the Secretary of Defense to manage the NRO in accordance with the Secretary of Defense's desires. Therefore, it would be preferable if the D/NRO were associated directly with the Office of the Secretary of Defense. This is an internal problem within the DoD.


8. Item 5 of the further recommendations of the President's Board should be amended to read: Assignment to the Department of Defense (Air Force) of the responsibility for the management, over-all



TOP SECRET

systems engineering, procurement and operation of all satellite reconnaissance systems developed within the Air Force, and assignment to the Central Intelligence Agency responsibility for research and development and procurement of the payloads of systems assigned to it under the NRP with responsibility for launching and recovery operations and related engineering for such CIA systems to be assigned to the Air Force.

9. Item 6 of the further recommendations should be amended to provide for use of the Configuration Control Board as an advisory rather than a decision-making entity.

  
John A. McCone  
Director of Central Intelligence

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